Economics at the FTC: Cases and Research, with a Focus on Petroleum
AbstractEconomics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) covers both the antitrust and consumer protection missions. In this year’s essay, we focus mainly on the competition-side of the agency. Drawing on a wealth of recent research, we provide descriptive and analytical information about the petroleum industry. Mergers, as always, were a major preoccupation of the FTC, and we discuss a few oil industry mergers as well as one leading litigated case – Arch Coal’s acquisition of Triton Coal. Finally, we review the empirical literature on the effects of vertical restraints, noting that the literature supporting an animus toward such restraints is surprisingly weak. Copyright Springer 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 27 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
antitrust; consumer protection; FTC; mergers; petroleum; vertical restraints;
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- Cooper, James C. & Froeb, Luke M. & O'Brien, Dan & Vita, Michael G., 2005. "Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 639-664, September.
- Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
- Aune, Finn Roar & Mohn, Klaus & Osmundsen, Petter & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2010.
"Financial market pressure, tacit collusion and oil price formation,"
Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 389-398, March.
- Aune, Finn Roar & Mohn, Klaus & Osmundsen, Petter & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2009. "Financial market pressures, tacit collusion and oil price formation," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/14, University of Stavanger.
- Pim Heijnen & Marco A. Haan & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2012. "Screening for Collusion: A Spatial Statistics Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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