“Economic Theory’s Stance On No-Fault Divorce”
AbstractThis article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault divorce in the United States, addressing modifications in the incentive structure of individuals that resulted from the legislative reforms of the 1970s. After stressing the importance of correctly interpreting and classifying divorce laws, this work investigates the contributions of the theory of property rights, the contributions of game theory and intra-household bargaining, and the contributions of general equilibrium analysis in our understanding of how divorce laws work and what their impact is. By doing so, this exposé analyzes the theoretical consequences of no-fault divorce on the decision whether to get married or divorced, on the characteristics of spouses and divorcees, on divorce rates, and on marital-specific and non marital-specific investments. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economics of the Household.
Volume (Year): 3 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=109451
divorce; no-fault; marriage; marital investments; incentives; B4; D1; K3;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
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