Conflict, Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy
AbstractCaplan and Stringham (2002) attempt to rebut the “paradox of cooperation” (Cowen and Sutter 1999) as it applies to libertarian anarchy. The paradox in the context of anarchy implies that if private defense agencies can cooperate to avoid conflict they can also collude to reestablish coercion. Caplan and Stringham argue that arbitration is self-enforcing while collusion requires solution of a prisoner’s dilemma. We agree that collusion requires more cooperative efficacy than arbitration, but maintain that arbitration requires considerably more organization than a simple coordination game. If a network of protection agencies can organize sufficiently to arbitrate disputes, they can also create a barrier to entry by refusing to arbitrate with entrants. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Review of Austrian Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335
anarchy; cooperation; evolution of government;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.