The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital
AbstractThis paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Austrian Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335
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- Bryane Michael, 2005. "The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes," Microeconomics 0511009, EconWPA.
- Assaf Meydani, 2008. "Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 301-312, December.
- Hederer, Christian, 2007. "Political Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: an Evolutionary Approach," MPRA Paper 8249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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