Against the stand-alone-cost test in U.S. freight rail regulation
AbstractThe stand-alone-cost test has become an expensive, extensive, and time-consuming part of the regulatory practice of the U.S. Surface Transportation Board in the performance of its statutory duty to protect "captive shippers" from monopoly rail rates. Worse, a close examination of the history of its adoption and application suggests only a very tenuous connection with its claimed intellectual foundations, the classic works of Faulhaber (1975) and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). It is time to retire this tool and replace it with something simpler and more effective and transparent.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Railroads; Regulation; Stand alone cost; Surface Transportation Board; Cross-subsidy; Contestability; K23; L51; L92;
Other versions of this item:
- Russell Pittman, 2010. "Against the Stand-Alone-Cost Test in U.S. Freight Rail Regulation," EAG Competition Advocacy Papers 201001CA, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Russell Pittman, 2004. "Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of Non-discriminatory Access to Infrastructure," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 167-192, 06.
- Ellig, Jerry, 2002. "Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 143-67, March.
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