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Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

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Author Info
Chifeng Dai ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-008-9059-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 75-85
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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:34:y:2008:i:1:p:75-85

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

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Related research
Keywords: Risk aversion; Incomplete information; Regulation; D8; L5;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. David Sappington, 1982. "Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 354-368, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chifeng Dai & Tracy R. Lewis & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2006. "Delegating Management to Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 503-520, Autumn.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-23.

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