Regulating internal markets for hospital care
Abstract
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 173-193
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Related research
Keywords: Internal markets; Asymmetry of Information; Hospital care; I11; I18; D82;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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9821, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Rosella Levaggi & Moretto Michele, 2008.
"Investment In Hospital Care Technology Under Different Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach,"
Bulletin of Economic Research,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 159-181, 04.
- Michele Moretto & Rosella Levaggi, 2004. "Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach," Working Papers 2004.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rossella Levaggi & Michele Moretto, 2007. "Investment in hospital care technology under different purchasing rules: a real option approach," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0046, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
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