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Regulatory Compliance with Nonlinear Penalties

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Author Info
Shaffer, Sherrill

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Abstract

Previous work has shown that, when firms choose only partial compliance with a regulatory standard, tightening the standard may drive firms' behavior in the wrong direction. This note explores the potential of nonlinear penalty functions to move behavior in the socially desired direction when standards are tightened without raising the total penalty. Copyright 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 99-103
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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:99-103

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  1. Chung-Huang Huang, 1996. "Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 183-204, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Anthony Heyes, 1994. "Environmental enforcement when ‘inspectability’ is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 479-494, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Drew Dahl & Douglas Evanoff & Michael Spivey, 2003. "The Timing and Persistence of CRA Compliance Ratings," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 113-132, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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