Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care
AbstractRegulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (05)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Health insurance; Health care; Regulation; Preference measurement; Discrete choice experiments; L51; D61; C93; I11; I18;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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