Vertical Integration and Competition Policy
AbstractThe European Commission has decided to implement a simplified procedure in the context of vertical integration. If the combined market shares of the merging firms is higher than 25 percent the Commission will investigate the merger thoroughly. Otherwise, the merger is considered harmless. The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare aspects of vertical integration in a simple model and investigate the accuracy of the proposed rule of thumb. Mergers turn out to be harmless from a social point of view when the upstream market is relatively less concentrated compared to the downstream market. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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