Medical Board Regulation of Physician Licensure: Is Excessive Malpractice Sanctioned?
AbstractThis paper considers the deterrent effect that self-regulation has on a patient's propensity to sue under malpractice law. A model of tort-driven self regulation is developed and its implications are examined using data on the disciplinary actions of the Florida Medical Board and data on closed malpractice claims. Doctors who in 1987-1991 generated abnormal rates of malpractice claims had a higher rate of disciplinary actions in the following period 1992-1995. Significantly, the evidence suggests that the Board may also be more likely to discipline older physicians and non-certified practitioners, perhaps in response to special interests of industry members. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
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