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Majoritarian Logic

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  • Buchanan, J M

Abstract

The analogues to Pareto dominance and Pareto superiority, majority dominance and majority superiority, allow restriction on the domain of outcomes for majority-rule choices. The logical structure of the argument extends and confirms the proposition that the effective alternatives for collective choice are endogenously determined by the existent rule for making choices. Orthodox public choice theory has, explicitly or implicitly, presumed that the choice alternatives are exogenous to the rule through which choices are made. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Buchanan, J M, 1998. "Majoritarian Logic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 13-21, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:1-2:p:13-21
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Fiscal Constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 3-25, March.
    2. Paulo Pereira, 2000. "From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-86, March.
    3. Erling Røed Larsen, 2002. "The Political Economy of Global Warming. From Data to Decisions," Discussion Papers 322, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    4. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 749, CESifo.
    5. Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay, 2003. "Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 95-105, June.

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