A long-standing empirical literature has been concerned with determining whether voters vote 'prospectively' or 'retrospectively.' Despite this interest, little is known about the consequences of one voting regime versus another. This study addresses this deficiency. The authors find that voter welfare can be greatly affected by the candidate selection technique employed by voters. Among other findings, they show that 'electing the best candidate' does not always maximize voter welfare. Furthermore, 'myopic' voting is sometimes superior to 'farsighted' voting. These findings have implications for interpretations of empirical studies of voter behavior. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 96 (1998) Issue (Month): 1-2 (July) Pages: 93-116 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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