Endogenizing the Median Voter: Public Choice Goes to School
AbstractThis paper investigates implications of the relationship between voter self-selection and the behavior of politicians. Voter self-selection arises in elections because only a portion of eligible voters actually vote. It is likely to be more pronounced whenever the implied net benefits from a given electoral choice are disproportionately distributed across voters. Public choice theory predicts that incumbent officials will manipulate this self-election pursuant to the maximization of their personal objective functions. This paper provides evidence from school bond elections that politicians influence voter self-selection via manipulation of election parameters. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 93 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Randy A. Ehrenberg & Christopher L. Smith & Liang Zhang, 2002.
"Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?,"
NBER Working Papers
9088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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