Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement
AbstractThis paper analyzes representatives' voting patterns on NAFTA. The public choice model posits that representatives vote to redistribute wealth to constituents. Evidence presented here indicates that the Heckscher-Ohlin model is appropriate to represent the redistributional effects of NAFTA. Using a three-factor variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, evidence is presented indicating that representatives voted to redistribute wealth to their geographical and electoral constituents. The ability of geographically concentrated interests and of special interests to influence representatives' votes helps to explain the weak party allegiance demonstrated on the NAFTA vote. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 92 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Cletus C. Coughlin, 2001. "Trade policy opinions at the state level," Working Papers 2001-006, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Dong-Hun Kim, 2010. "Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 49-65, April.
- Baban Hasnat & Charles Callahan, III, 2004. "The Determinants of US Congressional Voting on the Trade and Development Act of 2000," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 3(1), pages 35-44, April.
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