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Federal Antitrust Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective

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  • Vachris, M Albert

Abstract

This paper offers a critical examination of the appropriateness of the traditional model in describing the relationship between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and its congressional oversight committees. After studying the institutional reality of congressional oversight, I extend the traditional principal-agent model to incorporate both the Antitrust Division and the President as important players in the determination of federal antitrust policy. My empirical analysis of Antitrust Division enforcement trends covers almost four decades, from 1950 through the end of the Reagan administration. The results provide substantial the property rights of the congressional oversight committees are seriously attenuated, leaving open the possibly for bureaucratic discretion. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Vachris, M Albert, 1996. "Federal Antitrust Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(3-4), pages 223-238, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:88:y:1996:i:3-4:p:223-38
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph A. Clougherty & Nan Zhang, 0. "Foreign investor reactions to risk and uncertainty in antitrust: U.S. merger policy investigations and the deterrence of foreign acquirer presence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 0, pages 1-25.
    2. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2005. "Antitrust holdup source, cross‐national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 769-790, August.
    3. Joseph A. Clougherty & Nan Zhang, 2021. "Foreign investor reactions to risk and uncertainty in antitrust: U.S. merger policy investigations and the deterrence of foreign acquirer presence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(3), pages 454-478, April.
    4. Bryan P. Cutsinger & Alexander Marsella & Yang Zhou, 2022. "Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 127-144, July.

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