Rents from In-Kind Subsidy: "Charity" in the Public Sector
AbstractPublic choice analysis usually focuses attention on the behavior of self-interested individuals but this paper considers rent seeking when some taxpayers are motivated by altruism. Redistribution policies initiated by self-interested rent seekers require taxpayer approval. Even if taxpayers are fully informed, their resistance to inefficient schemes is reduced when public-sector schemes are the only means available to pursue altruistic goals. Altruism serves to broaden the scope within which rent seekers may operate. A discussion of international 'tied' aid illustrates the impact which rent seeking can exert on public-sector 'charity.' Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Abbott, Andrew & Jones, Philip, 2012. "Government spending: Is development assistance harmonised with other budgets?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 921-931.
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