This paper presents experimental evidence from a rent-seeking exercise where the highest bidder wins the rent but all bidders, including the winner, lose their wagers. This exercise closely resembles the rent-seeking dilemma facing agents in many settings. There are two main conclusions from the results. First, there is a tendency towards overdissipation of the rent. Second, some individuals are willing to pay more for a rent than its face value would warrant. The authors attribute this phenomenon to a 'thrill of victory' effect. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 83 (1995) Issue (Month): 3-4 (June) Pages: 305-12 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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