Partisan Views on the Economy
AbstractIn this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 81 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Potrafke, Niklas, 2013.
"Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 180-187.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Minority positions in theGerman Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 160, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis," Munich Reprints in Economics 19290, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Minority Positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A Political Economic Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 4206, CESifo Group Munich.
- Daniel Sutter, 1998. "Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 323-333, December.
- Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Towards an economic theory of party ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 223-240, May.
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