Fiscal Illusion at the Local Level: Empirical Evidence for the Flemish Municipalities
AbstractFiscal illusion refers to a systematically biased perception of fiscal parameters due to demand-side error/ignorance or supply-side abusive behavior. As such, it is a component of a more general tax choice framework. This paper focuses predominantly on the empirical estimation of the four major sources of fiscal illusion, namely the flypaper effect, renter illusion, and the complexity and elasticity of tax systems. The results--based on a data set of 302 Flemish municipalities--on balance suggest the existence of important illusionary effects. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 80 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Oates, Wallace E., 2005. "Property taxation and local public spending: the renter effect," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 419-431, May.
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004.
"Voters as a hard budget constraint: On the determination of intergovernmental grants,"
Marburg Working Papers on Economics
200418, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2005. "Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 147-169, April.
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-21, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Allers, Maarten & de Haan, Jakob & Sterks, Cees, 2001. " Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 351-63, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.