This paper uses an augmented Solow model with cross section data, to measure the effect on per-capita income of (1) the entrenchment of various rights in a country's constitution and (2) the level of economic freedom in a country, broadly construed. The results suggest that entrenchment, per se, of any single right seldom has a significant general economic effect, while the effect of economic freedom is significant and substantial. The paper then considers whether such evidence could support the proposition that 'constitutions do not matter.' While it concludes otherwise, it does caution against incurring excessive negotiation costs to obtain entrenchment of a comprehensive 'wish list' of rights. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 78 (1994) Issue (Month): 3-4 (March) Pages: 359-72 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)