Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Anomalies in Political Economy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Frey, Bruno S
  • Eichenberger, Reiner

Abstract

Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics indicate that under identifiable conditions individuals do not act in an economically rational way. These results are important for political economy. Anomalies appear in the behavior of voters, politicians, and administrators. Economic markets do not fully eliminate anomalies in the aggregation process. It is shown that political aggregation by democracy, bargaining, or bureaucracy may weaken or strengthen such individual anomalies. Moreover, institutions can partially be interpreted as endogenously emerging as a result of individuals' demands to cope with anomalies. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 68 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1-3 (January)
Pages: 71-89

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:68:y:1991:i:1-3:p:71-89

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Florian Schuett & Alexander K. Wagner, 2008. "Hindsight biased policy evaluation," LERNA Working Papers 08.08.252, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  2. Oleg Smirnov, 2009. "Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 277-290, December.
  3. Ashworth, John & Heyndels, Bruno & Smolders, Carine, 2003. "Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 741-762, December.
  4. Eckardt, Martina, 2004. "Evolutionary approaches to legal change," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 47, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  5. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  6. Bischoff, Ivo & Meckl, Jürgen, 2008. "Endowment effect theory, public goods and welfare," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1768-1774, October.
  7. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, . "Two Concerns about Rational Choice: Indoctrination and Imperialism," IEW - Working Papers 104, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  8. Michael Grillo & Miguel Teixeira & David Wilson, 2010. "Residential Satisfaction and Civic Engagement: Understanding the Causes of Community Participation," Social Indicators Research, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 451-466, July.
  9. Ivo Bischoff, 2008. "Endowment effect theory, prediction bias and publicly provided goods: an experimental study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 283-296, March.
  10. Asmus Olsen, 2013. "The politics of digits: evidence of odd taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 59-73, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:68:y:1991:i:1-3:p:71-89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.