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Why so much stability? On the single membership constituency and the law of large numbers: A note

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  • Uzi Segal
  • Avia Spivak

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  • Uzi Segal & Avia Spivak, 1986. "Why so much stability? On the single membership constituency and the law of large numbers: A note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 183-190, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:49:y:1986:i:2:p:183-190
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00181040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 31-43, March.
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