IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v35y1980i5p587-606.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A general theory of interpersonal exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Jon Cauley
  • Todd Sandler

Abstract

A general theory of interpersonal exchange is developed from a public goods, public choice point of view and within an analytical context that assesses both the benefits and the costs of social interaction. Social transaction benefits and costs are specified as a composite function of interpersonal bindingness, which itself depends upon five parameters. The model provides for the determination of an optimal personal degree of bindingness in a two-person relationship. Extensions encompass the more interesting reaction case, where two individuals each select their own optimal personal bindingness levels. Applications and conclusions complete the paper. qu]When love beckons to you, follow him, Though his ways are hard and steep ... For even as love crowns you so shall he crucify you. Even as he is for your growth so is he for your pruning. Kahlil Gibran The Prophet Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Suggested Citation

  • Jon Cauley & Todd Sandler, 1980. "A general theory of interpersonal exchange," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 587-606, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:5:p:587-606
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00140088
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00140088
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00140088?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sandler, Todd M, 1975. "Pareto Optimality, Pure Public Goods, Impure Public Goods and Multiregional Spillovers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 22(1), pages 25-38, February.
    2. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Benedetto Gui, 2013. "Relational goods," Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Stefano Zamagni (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, chapter 30, pages 295-305, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2018. "A note on the privatization neutrality result with colluding private firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2016-2025.
    2. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2009. "Organization, learning and cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 39-53, May.
    3. Simon P Anderson & Jacob K Goeree & Charles A Holt, 2001. "A Thoeretical Anlysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000075, David K. Levine.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca & Sodini, Mauro, 2012. "Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 1469-1478.
    6. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Matsushima, Noriaki & Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Competitiveness and R&D competition revisited," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 541-547.
    7. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2016. "On the price effects of collusion and the number of firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(3), pages 1694-1704.
    8. Jagmohan S. Raju & Abhik Roy, 2000. "Market Information and Firm Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(8), pages 1075-1084, August.
    9. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Van Long, Ngo, 2022. "A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    10. d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2009. "Price-quantity competition with varying toughness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 62-82, January.
    11. Ulrich Witt & Tom Broekel & Thomas Brenner, 2012. "Knowledge and its Economic Characteristics: A Conceptual Clarification," Chapters, in: Richard Arena & Agnès Festré & Nathalie Lazaric (ed.), Handbook of Knowledge and Economics, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Marco F. Boretto & Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada, 2021. "Oligopoly model with interdependent preferences: existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium," Working Papers 462, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2021.
    13. Hirose, Kosuke & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2022. "Common ownership and environmental Corporate Social Responsibility," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    14. Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Stehn, Jürgen, 1995. "Perspektiven der sozialen Marktwirtschaft - mehr Effizienz durch eine föderative Arbeitsteilung," Kiel Working Papers 680, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    15. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives," MPRA Paper 108521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Escrihuela-Villar Marc, 2016. "On Merger Profitability and the Intensity of Rivalry," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1203-1212, April.
    18. Michelacakis, Nickolas J., 2023. "Nash versus consistent equilibrium: A comparative perspective on a mixed duopoly location model of spatial price discrimination with delegation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    19. Shibata, Takashi, 2014. "Market structure and R&D investment spillovers," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 321-329.
    20. George Symeonidis, 2000. "Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 53-83, March.
    21. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric, 2016. "Imperfect cartelization in OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 333-344.
    22. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima & Susumu Cato, 2009. "Relative Performance and R&D Competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0752, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:5:p:587-606. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.