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Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas

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  • Gonzalo Córdoba
  • Alberto Penadés

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Córdoba & Alberto Penadés, 2009. "Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 391-403, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:141:y:2009:i:3:p:391-403
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9460-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adam Przeworski, 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 253-273, June.
    2. Blais, Andr㉠& Dobrzynska, Agnieska & Indridason, Indridi H., 2005. "To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 182-190, January.
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