Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

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Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

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Lambert Schoonbeek ()

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Lambert Schoonbeek

Abstract

We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 131 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 453-464
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:131:y:2007:i:3:p:453-464

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Paper
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2006. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Research Report 06C11, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management). [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2004. "Delegation in a group-contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 263-272, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2002. "Delegation in a group-contest," CCSO Working Papers 200201, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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