Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note
AbstractWe examine every TDS Bill introduced by the House of Representatives and approved by the U.S. International Trade Commission in the last six years. The significant relationship between these bills and campaign contributions coupled with the personal characteristics of proponents and sponsors influence the policy outcomes of the U.S. TDS Program. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 131 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Temporary duty suspension; Political contributions;
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