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Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance

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Author Info
Eugenia Belova ()
Valery Lazarev

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Abstract

Archival data on annual budgets of the Communist party shed light on how this cornerstone Soviet institution was maintained and on the party-state relationships in a one-party polity. The party depended on subsidies from the state budget until the mid-1950s and became largely self-financed afterwards. The costs of maintaining the party were significant compared to other branches of government. We consider three models of the party – “party-agent”, “party-ruler” and “party-political club” – to study the evolution of the party’s institutional role and find that by the 1950s, the party transforms from an economic agent of the state into an increasingly autonomous institution. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9096-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 130 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 437-456
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:437-456

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Related research
Keywords: Soviet Union; One-party regime; Public finance; Institutions;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ferrero, Mario, 2001. "Political exchange in mass party regimes and the transition from socialism," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 365-379, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Anderson, Gary M & Boettke, Peter J, 1997. " Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(1-2), pages 37-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dmitriy Gershenson & Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(1), pages 31-47, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Bishop & Haiyong Liu, 2008. "Liberalization and rent-seeking in China’s labor market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 151-164, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," MPRA Paper 2352, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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