Advanced Search

1 dictator=2 voters

Contents:

Author Info

  • Antonio Quesada

    ()

Abstract

For the case of strict preferences, a measure of a voter’s average power in a dictatorial social welfare function is defined making the dictator never have more average power than three voters and, as the number of voters grows, making the dictator average power converge to the average power of two voters. This result suggests, as those in Tangian (2004), that dictatorial social welfare functions might not be as undesirable aggregation rules as traditionally held. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9094-0
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 130 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 395-400
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:395-400

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords: Arrow’s theorem; Social welfare function; Strict preference; Voters’ power;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
  1. Andranik Tangian, 2010. "Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow’s dictators?)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 129-161, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:395-400

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.