Public choice and political philosophy: Reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan
AbstractThe paper explores some of the surprisingly many relations between theories of public choice and political philosophy. Focusing on variants of Homo oeconomicus it does so systematically rather than historically. But it factors in the history of the two disciplines along with some recent developments in (experimental) economics. This sheds new light on the counterfactual assumption that in politics everybody should be supposed to be a knave and suggests that we better seek factually sound behavioral foundations for Public Choice. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 125 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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