Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests
AbstractUsing a public-policy application of Tullock's two-player rent-seeking contest, this paper focuses on the relationship between the aggregate expected utility of the players and their asymmetric valuations. In our game these valuations are the players' payoffs in the two possible states of nature, namely, the approval and rejection of the proposed public policy. Our main result provides the condition that ensures that the aggregate expected payoff of the two contestants (the interest groups that compete on the approval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuation parameters. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2005.
"Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring,"
- Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 475-486, December.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003.
"Political culture and monopoly price determination,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, 08.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series 646, CESifo Group Munich.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006.
"Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 265-282, 05.
- Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2006. "The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest," Working Papers 72/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.