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Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests

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  • Epstein, Gil S
  • Nitzan, Shmuel

Abstract

Using a public-policy application of Tullock's two-player rent-seeking contest, this paper focuses on the relationship between the aggregate expected utility of the players and their asymmetric valuations. In our game these valuations are the players' payoffs in the two possible states of nature, namely, the approval and rejection of the proposed public policy. Our main result provides the condition that ensures that the aggregate expected payoff of the two contestants (the interest groups that compete on the approval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuation parameters. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Gil S & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 137-142, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:112:y:2002:i:1-2:p:137-42
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pecorino, 2016. "Individual welfare and the group size paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 137-152, July.
    2. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 475-486, December.
    4. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2006. "The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest," Working Papers 72/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    5. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "Political culture and monopoly price determination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, August.
    6. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 265-282, May.
    7. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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