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What's Yours is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law

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  • Osborne, Evan

Abstract

The paper develops a rent-seeking theory of the common law. The general finding is that the law's form depends on the comparative advantage each group has in production versus appropriation generally, and appropriation via litigation in particular. The model generates new interpretations of developments in United States common law, and is used both to supplement and to criticize two dominant theories of such law, the efficiency theory associated with the law and economics movement and that generated by critical legal studies scholars. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Osborne, Evan, 2002. "What's Yours is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 399-415, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:111:y:2002:i:3-4:p:399-415
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    Cited by:

    1. Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2008. "Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 10, pages 229-250, Springer.
    2. Goerke, Laszlo & Neugart, Michael, 2015. "Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 50-62.
    3. Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2018. "On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 128-130.
    4. ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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