Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying
AbstractInterest groups lobby over a variety of issues including private bills. There are two striking facts about private bills introduced in the U.S. Congress. First, several scandals have involved Congressmen who were being bribed to introduce a private bill. Second, the number of private bills introduced has drastically changed over time. A theoretical model and an econometric model are developed to explain these phenomena. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 111 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Michel Le Berton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2007.
"Legislative lobbying under political uncertainty,"
Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers
ces0710, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
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