Inter-party Competition, Intra-party Competition, and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data
AbstractThis paper presents a theoretical model examining the influence of two stylized types of voters: "loyal voters" and "swing voters". The model shows why both types of voters will influence the distribution of benefits by a reelection-seeking incumbent, and it predicts how their influence will vary with the importance of the general election relative to that of the primary: closer competition between parties in the general election, ceteris paribus, increases the influence of swing voters relative to that of loyal voters. County-level data on the allocation of money and jobs by New Deal relief programs confirm the model's predictions. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 108 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401006, EconWPA.
- Fishback, Price V. & Kantor, Shawn & Wallis, John Joseph, 2003.
"Can the New Deal's three Rs be rehabilitated? A program-by-program, county-by-county analysis,"
Explorations in Economic History,
Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 278-307, July.
- Price V. Fishback & Shawn Kantor & John Joseph Wallis, 2002. "Can the New Deal's Three R's Be Rehabilitated? A Program-by-Program, County-by-County Analysis," NBER Working Papers 8903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Microeconomics 0311002, EconWPA.
- Todd Sorensen & Price V. Fishback & Samuel Allen & Shawn E. Kantor, 2007.
"Migration Creation, Diversion, and Retention: New Deal Grants and Migration: 1935-1940,"
NBER Working Papers
13491, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sorensen, Todd A. & Fishback, Price & Allen, Samuel K. & Kantor, Shawn, 2007. "Migration Creation, Diversion, and Retention: New Deal Grants and Migration: 1935-1940," IZA Discussion Papers 3060, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Price Fishback & Samuel Allen & Jonathan Fox & Brendan Livingston, 2010.
"A Patchwork Safety Net: A Survey Of Cliometric Studies Of Income Maintenance Programs In The United States In The First Half Of The Twentieth Century,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 895-940, December.
- Price V. Fishback & Samuel Allen & Jonathan Fox & Brendan Livingston, 2010. "A Patchwork Safety Net: A Survey of Cliometric Studies of Income Maintenance Programs in the United States in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," NBER Working Papers 15696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401009, EconWPA.
- Fishback, Price V. & Horrace, William C. & Kantor, Shawn, 2006. "The impact of New Deal expenditures on mobility during the Great Depression," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 179-222, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.