Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU
AbstractWhy do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.
Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323
European Monetary Union; interest groups; banking policy; bank cooperation; E5; F3; G2;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
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