Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hans Grüner
  • Carsten Hefeker

Abstract

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01886820
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 183-198

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:183-198

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323

Related research

Keywords: European Monetary Union; interest groups; banking policy; bank cooperation; E5; F3; G2;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bofinger, Peter, 1994. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," CEPR Discussion Papers 915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(04), pages 425-451, September.
  3. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-21, May.
  4. George S. Tavlas, 2009. "Optimum-Currency-Area Paradoxes," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 536-551, 08.
  5. L. J. Ruland & J.-M. Viaene, 1993. "The Political Choice Of The Exchange Rate Regime," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 271-284, November.
  6. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Banking Competition and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Giovanni, Alberto, 1993. "Central banking in a monetary union: reflections on the proposed statute of the European Central Bank," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 191-230, June.
  8. Vaubel, Roland, 1990. "Currency Competition and European Monetary Integration," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 936-46, September.
  9. Barry Eichengreen & Jeffry Frieden, 1993. "The Political Economy Of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 85-104, 07.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
  2. Gruner, Hans Peter, 1997. " A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy When Central Bankers Have Private Objectives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 127-43, July.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:183-198. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.