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Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Pompeo Posta
Valeria Bonis ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review .
Volume (Year): 20 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 241-263
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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:20:y:2009:i:2:p:241-263Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Fiscal and monetary policy coordination ; Monetary union ; International fiscal issues ; E61 ; F42 ; H87 ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001.
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Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998.
"Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers ,"
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Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995.
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[Downloadable!] Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995.
"Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers ,"
Research Memoranda
024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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Other versions: Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003.
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Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999.
"Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro ,"
Open Economies Review ,
Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February.
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