Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Losers and losers: Some demographics of medical malpractice tort reforms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andrew Friedson
  • Thomas Kniesner

    ()

Abstract

Our research examines how recent reforms have affected a key aspect of patients’ implicit insurance present in medical malpractice torts. Specifically, we estimate how non-economic damages caps affected pre-trial settlement speed and settlement amounts. Maximum entropy (most likely) quantile regressions emphasize that the post-reform settlement effects most informative for policy evaluation differ greatly from OLS (mean) estimates and clarify the conclusion emerging. In particular, the effect of the tort reform here can best be thought of as a 25% tax on the asset value of settlements that exempts settlements involving infants. The social welfare effects of tort reform are less clear than the asset reduction effects due to likely health state dependent utility. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11166-012-9152-6
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 45 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 115-133

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:45:y:2012:i:2:p:115-133

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

Related research

Keywords: Medical malpractice; Tort reform; Texas closed claims; Damage caps; Quantile regression; Maximum entropy; C21; I18; K13;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Donald Keenan & Donald Rudow & Arthur Snow, 2008. "Risk preferences and changes in background risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 139-152, April.
  2. Kniesner, Thomas J. & Viscusi, W. Kip & Ziliak, James P., 2009. "Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions," IZA Discussion Papers 4508, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Beomsoo Kim, 2007. "The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S79-S119, 06.
  4. Bera, A. K. & Galvao Jr, A. F. & Montes-Rojas, G. & Park, S. Y., 2010. "Which quantile is the most informative? Maximum likelihood, maximum entropy and quantile regression," Working Papers 10/08, Department of Economics, City University London.
  5. Golan, Amos, 2008. "Information and Entropy Econometrics — A Review and Synthesis," Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, now publishers, vol. 2(1–2), pages 1-145, February.
  6. Steffen Andersen & Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 2008. "Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 583-618, 05.
  7. Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi & Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, 2010. "The Value of a Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 122, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
  8. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May.
  9. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Viscusi, W Kip, 1988. "Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 101-21, January.
  11. Daniel P. Kessler, 2011. "Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 93-110, Spring.
  12. David A. Matsa, 2007. "Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from Tort Reform Damage Caps," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S143-S182, 06.
  13. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2006. "The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 609-634, July.
  14. James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger, 2010. "Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: Discounted Expected Utility with a Disproportionate Preference for Certainty," NBER Working Papers 16348, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 69-82, January.
  16. Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, 2008. "Medical Malpractice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195720, December.
  17. W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, 2005. "Damages Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(1), pages 23-43.
  18. Viscusi, W Kip & Evans, William N, 1990. "Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 353-74, June.
  19. Joni Hersch & Jeffrey O'Connell & W. Kip Viscusi, 2007. "An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S231-S259, 06.
  20. Ronen Avraham, 2007. "An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S183-S229, 06.
  21. Golan, Amos, 2007. "Information and entropy econometrics - volume overview and synthesis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 379-387, June.
  22. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability," NBER Working Papers 15383, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:45:y:2012:i:2:p:115-133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.