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Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining

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  • Roth, Alvin E

Abstract

This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literatrue. These new derivations clarify the relationshps among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers affects the outcome of bargaining as predicted by Nash's (axiomatic) solution of a static bargaining model (Nash, 1950) and by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon sequential bargaining game analyzed by Rubinstein (1982). The analogous, experimentally testable predictions for finite horizon sequential bargaining games are also presented. Copyright 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 2 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 353-65

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:2:y:1989:i:4:p:353-65

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

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Cited by:
  1. Oscar Volij, 1999. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Economic theory and game theory 010, Oscar Volij.
  2. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2011. "Procedurally Fair Taxation," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.
  4. Di Corato, Luca, 2010. "Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization," Working Papers 58292, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics.
  5. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  6. Britz Volker & Herings Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2010. "Theory of the Firm: Bargaining and Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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