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Reasons for Rank-Dependent Utility Evaluation

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  • Weber, Elke U
  • Kirsner, Britt
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    Abstract

    Three reasons for why people may evaluate utility in a rank-dependent fashion have been suggested: (a) rank-dependent weighting is a function of perceptual biases and thus not prescriptively defensible; (b) weights are (re)distributed by motivational processes that reflect stable personality characteristics of the decision maker; and (c) weights are (re)distributed as a function of the situation, allowing rank-dependent evaluation to be a rational response to an environment with asymmetric loss functions. By modifying a study by Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) we show that all three processes--that is, perceptual biases, individual predispositions in weighting, as well as rational adaptation to an asymmetric loss function--can be involved in rank-dependent weighting. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

    Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 41-61

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:14:y:1997:i:1:p:41-61

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    2. Henry Stott, 2006. "Cumulative prospect theory's functional menagerie," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 101-130, March.
    3. Carlos Capistrán & Allan Timmermann, 2006. "Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 3, Society for Computational Economics.
    4. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," MPRA Paper 8844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Langlais, Eric, 2005. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
      [Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmet
      ," MPRA Paper 1150, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Nov 2006.
    6. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-30, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
    7. K. Carrie Armel & Aurelie Beaumel & Antonio Rangel, 2008. "Biasing simple choices by manipulating relative visual attention," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 3, pages 396-403, June.
    8. Peter Brooks & Horst Zank, 2005. "Loss Averse Behavior," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 301-325, December.
    9. Birnbaum, Michael H. & Patton, Jamie N. & Lott, Melissa K., 1999. "Evidence against Rank-Dependent Utility Theories: Tests of Cumulative Independence, Interval Independence, Stochastic Dominance, and Transitivity, , , ," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 44-83, January.
    10. Andrade, Eduardo B., 2011. "Excessive confidence in visually-based estimates," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 252-261.
    11. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Legal Interpretative Process and Litigants’Cognitive Biases," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-8, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
    12. Singer, Marcos & Donoso, Patricio & Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos, 2008. "A static model of cooperation for group-based incentive plans," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 492-501, October.
    13. Brown, Gordon D. A. & Gardner, Jonathan & Oswald, Andrew J. & Qian, Jing, 2005. "Does Wage Rank Affect Employees' Wellbeing?," IZA Discussion Papers 1505, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    14. Peter Brooks & Simon Peters & Horst Zank, 2014. "Risk behavior for gain, loss, and mixed prospects," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 153-182, August.
    15. Laetitia Placido & Olivier L'Haridon, 2008. "An allais paradox for generalized expected utility theories?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(19), pages 1-6.
    16. Birnbaum, Michael H. & Chavez, Alfredo, 1997. "Tests of Theories of Decision Making: Violations of Branch Independence and Distribution Independence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 161-194, August.

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