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A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism

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  • Hua Sun

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  • Hua Sun, 2010. "A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 387-411, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:40:y:2010:i:4:p:387-411
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-009-9226-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    2. Michael E. Solt & Norman G. Miller, 1985. "Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 13(4), pages 404-423, December.
    3. Capozza, Dennis R & Seguin, Paul J, 2000. "Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 91-116, March.
    4. Brent W. Ambrose & Peter Linneman, 2001. "Reit Organizational Structure and Operating Characteristics," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 21(3), pages 141-162.
    5. John S. Howe & James D. Shilling, 1990. "REIT Advisor Performance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 18(4), pages 479-500, December.
    6. Chan, Su Han & Erickson, John & Wang, Ko, 2002. "Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure: Structure, Performance, and Investment Opportunities," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195155341, Decembrie.
    7. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin Hon Sheng Yap & Seow Eng Ong & Wee Yong Yeo, 2018. "Demystifying the Management Structure Puzzle: an Empirical Investigation into the Drivers of REIT Internalization," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 367-399, October.
    2. George Cashman & David Harrison & Michael Seiler, 2014. "Advisor Choice in Asia-Pacific Property Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 271-298, February.
    3. Yongheng Deng & Maggie (Rong) Hu & Anand Srinivasan, 2017. "Information Asymmetry and Organizational Structure: Evidence from REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 32-64, July.

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