Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend Decisions in REITs?
AbstractConflict of interest between shareholders (principal) and managers (agent) is a potential weakness of the modern corporate form. Various monitoring mechanisms—pay for performance compensation schemes, mix of cash compensation and long term compensation, the independence of the board of directors, the market for takeovers, and capital structure—have been developed to discipline management and motivate them to maximize shareholder wealth. We test the hypothesis that dividend payout levels reflect the quality of and motivation for managerial decision making and are a function of performance and monitoring effectiveness. Consistent with this hypothesis, our analyses indicate that dividend payout, and dividend yield are functions of corporate performance, board structure, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership of company shares. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945
Dividend policy; Performance; Corporate governance; Managerial entrenchment;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert D. Campbell & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. F. Sirmans, 2001. "The Information Content of Method of Payment in Mergers: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 361-387.
- Marc C. Chopin & Ross N. Dickens & Roger M. Shelor, 1995. "An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 10(3), pages 263-278.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1996. "The financial performance of reverse leveraged buyouts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 293-332, November.
- Chandra S. Mishra & James F. Nielsen, 2000. "Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large Bank Holding Companies," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 29(3), Fall.
- Ghosh, Chinmoy & Sirmans, C F, 2003. "Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 287-318, March-May.
- Barbara J. Davis & Roger M. Shelor, 1995. "Executive Compensation and Financial Performance in the Real Estate Industry," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 10(2), pages 141-152.
- Hu, Aidong & Kumar, Praveen, 2004. "Managerial Entrenchment and Payout Policy," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 759-790, December.
- Schooley, Diane K & Barney, L Dwayne, Jr, 1994. "Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 363-73, Fall.
- Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1997. "Executive stock ownership and performance Tracking faint traces," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 223-255, August.
- Pennathur, Anita K & Shelor, Roger M, 2002. "The Determinants of REIT CEO Compensation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 99-113, July.
- Ghosh, Chinmoy & Petrova, Milena & Xiao, Yihong, 2012. "Do REITs use cash reserves efficiently? Evidence from corporate acquisitions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 1953-1970.
- Benjamin Blau & Matthew Hill & Hao Wang, 2011. "REIT Short Sales and Return Predictability," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 481-503, May.
- Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 385-410, November.
- Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 225-251, October.
- Nicolas Kohl & Wolfgang Schaefers, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: Evidence from Europe," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 362-393, April.
- William Hardin & Michael Highfield & Matthew Hill & G. Kelly, 2009. "The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 39-57, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.