Capital Distribution Policy and Information Asymmetry: A Real Estate Market Perspective
AbstractThis article examines the relation between the distribution of capital to real estate investors and a market-based measure of information asymmetry. Previous research suggests that information asymmetries decrease as capital is distributed to outside investors. However, little attention has been given to those firms for which the marginal benefit of increased distributions may be small. Our analyses are based on a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs), which are popularly characterized as high yield investments due to the regulation of a minimum distribution policy. The extent to which information asymmetry is influenced by these regulations, as well as by the opaque nature of the underlying assets, is an interesting empirical question. The results based on several years of data indicate that the perception of asymmetric information is lower for REM that distribute more capital to their shareholders. A decomposition of yield into income and return-of-capital components reveals no differential effect in information relevance. The insights drawn from the results may be useful in determining the efficacy of real estate capital distribution policies and regulations. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 225-251, October.
- Paul Anglin & Robert Edelstein & Yanmin Gao & Desmond Tsang, 2011. "How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Investor Information? The Curious Case of REITs," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24.
- Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & Fan He & C. Sirmans, 2010. "Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEO Compensation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 446-479, May.
- Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 385-410, November.
- Wen-Hsiu Chou & William Hardin & Matthew Hill & G. Kelly, 2013. "Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 91-114, January.
- Chinmoy Ghosh & Scott Roark & C. Sirmans, 2013. "On The Operating Performance of REITs Following Seasoned Equity Offerings: Anomaly Revisited," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 633-663, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.