Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information
Abstract
This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic PublishersDownload Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 251-74
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Larribeau, Sophie, 2002.
"A Structural Econometric Model of Price Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3302, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert Gary-Bobo & Sophie Larribeau, 2002. "A Structural Econometric Model of Price Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 739, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ronel Elul, 2005. "Collateral, credit history, and the financial decelerator," Working Papers 05-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron & Andrew B. Chong, 2004. "The Emergence of Captive Finance Companies and Risk Segmentation of the Consumer Loan Market:Theory and Evidence," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 584, Econometric Society.
- Souphala Chomsisengphet & Ronel Elul, 2005. "Bankruptcy exemptions, credit history, and the mortgage market," Working Papers 04-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Larribeau, Sophie, 2004. "A structural econometric model of price discrimination in the French mortgage lending industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 101-134, January.
- Danny Ben-Shahar, 2008. "Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value: a Theoretical Analysis under Competitive and Non-Competitive Mortgage Markets," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 30(2), pages 161-190.
- Dietz, Robert D. & Haurin, Donald R., 2003. "The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 401-450, November.
- Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2008. "Where's the smoking gun? a study of underwriting standards for US subprime mortgages," Working Papers 2008-036, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Wang, Fan, 2007. "Risk-Based Pricing of High Loan-To-Value Mortgage," MPRA Paper 4788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 2001. "The law and economics of remedies of predatory lending," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr, pages 155-169.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Larribeau, Sophie, 2003.
"The Bank's Market Power and the Interest Rate Elasticity of Demand for Housing: An Econometric Study of Discrimination on French Mortgage Data,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert J. GARY-BOBO & Sophie LARRIBEAU, 2003. "The Bank's Market Power and the Interest-Rate Elasticity of Demand for Housing: An Econometric Study of Discrimination on French Mortgage Data," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 71-72, pages 377-398.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Katherine A. Pancak, 2013. "Using Eminent Domain to Write-Down Mortgages: An Economic Analysis," Working papers 2013-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Lin, Emily Y. & White, Michelle J., 2001. "Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and Home Improvement Loans," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 138-162, July.
- AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2005. "A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities," Working papers 2005-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Brent Ambrose & Anthony Sanders, 2004. "Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 133-151, November.
- Ambrose, Brent W. & Pennington-Cross, Anthony & Yezer, Anthony M., 2002. "Credit Rationing in the U.S. Mortgage Market: Evidence from Variation in FHA Market Shares," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 272-294, March.
- Calem, P. & Cannon, M. & Nakamura, L.I., 2011. "Credit Cycle and Adverse Selection Effects in Consumer Credit Markets – Evidence from the HELOC Market," Discussion Paper 2011-086, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- William Apgar & Gary Fauth & Allegra Calder, 2005. "Industry structure perpetuates dual market," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr.
- James Kau & Donald Keenan & Constantine Lyubimov & V. Slawson, 2012. "Asymmetric Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 67-89, January.
- Amy Cutts & Robert Order, 2004. "On the Economics of Subprime Lending," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 167-196, November.
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