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Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle

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  • Capozza, Dennis R
  • Seguin, Paul J

Abstract

This study investigates why externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) underperform their internally managed counterparts. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REITs managed by external advisors underperform internally managed ones by over 7 percent per year. Property-level cash-flow yields are similar between the two managerial forms, but corporate-level expenses and especially interest expenses are responsible for lower levels of cash available to shareholders in externally advised REITs. We document that the higher-interest expenses are due to both higher levels of debt and to higher debt yields for externally advised REITs. We posit that compensating managers based on either assets under management or on property-level cash flows creates incentives for managers to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs are unfavorable. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 91-116

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:91-116

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945

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Cited by:
  1. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Robert Fok & Chiuling Lu, 2011. "An Analysis of Lockups in REIT IPOs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 359-384, October.
  2. Stephen M. Miller & Thomas M. Springer, 2007. "Cost Improvements, Returns to Scale, and Cost Inefficiencies for Real Estate Investment Trusts," Working papers 2007-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  3. Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Barbara Petracci & Massimo Spisni, 2011. "Fee Structure, Financing, and Investment Decisions: The Case of REITs," Working Paper Series 30_11, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  4. Han, Bing, 2004. "Insider Ownership and Corporate Value: Evidences from Real Estate Investment Trust," Working Paper Series 2004-1, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  5. Hua Sun, 2010. "A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 387-411, May.
  6. Nicolas Kohl & Wolfgang Schaefers, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: Evidence from Europe," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 362-393, April.
  7. George Cashman & David Harrison & Michael Seiler, 2014. "Advisor Choice in Asia-Pacific Property Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 271-298, February.
  8. Patrick Lecomte & Joseph Ooi, 2013. "Corporate Governance and Performance of Externally Managed Singapore Reits," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 664-684, May.
  9. Brent W. Ambrose & Peter Linneman, 2001. "Reit Organizational Structure and Operating Characteristics," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 21(3), pages 141-162.
  10. William Hardin & Michael Highfield & Matthew Hill & G. Kelly, 2009. "The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 39-57, July.
  11. Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2005. "On REIT CEO Compensation: Does Board Structure Matter?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 397-428, June.

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