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What do board members in art organizations do? A grounded theory approach

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  • Odile Paulus
  • Christophe Lejeune

Abstract

This paper explores the characteristics and activities of board members in art organizations. It describes two case studies within international artists’ residencies in France and Germany. Adopting a grounded theory approach, our study identifies the different characteristics of board members such as friendship, competence and diversity, together with board activities such as controlling, advising, legitimating, helping, exchanging and deciding. The contributions of this research are twofold. First, contrary to most governance literature, the independence of board members and board monitoring roles do not seem to be important issues for the two art organizations involved. Instead, friendship and networking appear to be key factors for the board, helping the organizations to be successful by giving them more chance to survive and grow. Second, as specific board members in the two cases studied, executive directors play a continual role of “governance entrepreneurs,” building and managing various board-related organs to counterbalance the influence of fund providers. In this way, executive directors attempt to satisfy their predominant public fund providers and to help the artists’ residencies survive. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Odile Paulus & Christophe Lejeune, 2013. "What do board members in art organizations do? A grounded theory approach," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 963-988, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:17:y:2013:i:4:p:963-988
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9207-0
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