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Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A Comment on Switgard Feuerstein's Survey

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Author Info
Kai-Uwe Kühn ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10842-005-4870-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 207-215
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:207-215

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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724

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Related research
Keywords: collusion; robustness; Nash reversion; optimal punishments; renegotiation; tacit cullusion; competition;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Deneckere, R., 1983. "Duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-42. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Friedman, James W. & Thisse, Jacques-Francis, 1994. "Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 271-283, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jürgen Meckl, 1996. "Market power of firms and exchange-rate fluctuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 57-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 82-106, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Switgard Feuerstein, 2004. "Collusion with Fluctuating Exchange Rates: A Note," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 107-116, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cabral, Luis M. B. & Mello, Antonio S., 1997. "Exchange rate expectations and market shares," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 61-67, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1991. "The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 767-92, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 167-204, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 581-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  14. Rothschild, R., 1999. "Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 717-734, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kühn, Kai-Uwe, 2004. "The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Stenbacka, L Rune, 1990. "Collusion in Dynamic Oligopolies in the Presence of Entry Threats," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2), pages 147-54, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 289-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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