Export Cartels and Domestic Markets
AbstractThis paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the icnreased possiblity for collusion in both markets. A condition is given under which this is the case.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
Volume (Year): 2 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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