Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.
Volume (Year): 26 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934
Bank regulation; bank supervision; incentive-compatible.;
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