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Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

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  • Arturo Estrella

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/B:FINA.0000037544.40421.68
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 26 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 145-160

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:26:y:2004:i:2:p:145-160

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

Related research

Keywords: Bank regulation; bank supervision; incentive-compatible.;

References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
  2. Estrella, Arturo, 2004. "The cyclical behavior of optimal bank capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1469-1498, June.
  3. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  4. Kambhu, John, 1990. "Concealment of Risk and Regulation of Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 397-414, December.
  5. Kambhu, John, 1988. "Unilateral disclosure of private information by a regulated firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-82, July.
  6. Giammarino, R.M. & Sappington, D.E.M., 1990. "An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Papers 367, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  7. Jerry R. Green, 1982. "Statistical Decision Theory Requiring Incentives for Information Transfer," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 77-106 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Freixas, Xavier & Gabillon, Emmanuelle, 1999. "Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 111-34, September.
  9. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, January.
  11. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May.
  12. Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & James Moser, 2001. "Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 213-232, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Haibin Zhu, 2008. "Capital Regulation and Banks' Financial Decisions," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 165-211, March.
  2. Niinimaki, J.-P., 2012. "Hidden loan losses, moral hazard and financial crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14.
  3. VanHoose, David, 2007. "Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3680-3697, December.
  4. D'Avino, Carmela & Lucchetta, Marcella, 2010. "Opacity of Banks and Runs with Solvency," MPRA Paper 24166, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Helder Mendonça & Renato Villela Loures, 2009. "Market discipline in the Brazilian banking industry: an analysis for the subordinated debt holders," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 286-307, December.

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