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Universal Banking Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

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  • Sanjay Banerji
  • Andrew Chen

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  • Sumon Mazumdar
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1019776908768
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 169-187

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:22:y:2002:i:3:p:169-187

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

    Related research

    Keywords: Universal banking; bilateral information asymmetry; double-sided moral hazard; capital structure.;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Gorton, G. & Khan, J., 1992. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegociation," RCER Working Papers 327, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    2. John H. Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce D. Smith, 1998. "Moral hazard under commercial and universal banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 426-471.
    3. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1990. "Debt covenants and renegotiation," Working Papers 90-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Giammarino, R.M. & Sappington, D.E.M., 1990. "An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Papers 367, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    5. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
    6. Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, 1996. "Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms," NBER Working Papers 5453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September.
    8. Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September.
    9. John Krainer, 1998. "The separation of banking and commerce," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue jul3.
    10. Mitchell Berlin & Kose John & Anthony Saunders, 1995. "Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress," Working Papers 96-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    11. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, 02.
    12. Sun Bae Kim, 1992. "Corporate financing through a shareholder bank: lessons from Japan," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 92-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    13. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
    14. Prowse, Stephen D, 1992. " The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1121-40, July.
    15. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. " Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 227-45, March.
    16. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-32.
    17. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan," NBER Working Papers 3435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 415-32, July.
    19. Peter Temin, 1991. "Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number temi91-1, May.
    20. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
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