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Rank-order tournaments and selection

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  • Derek Clark

    ()

  • Christian Riis

    ()

Abstract

Rank order tournaments are often presented as incentive devices: a tournament in which the hardest working individual gains promotion to the next level in a firms' hierarchy may induce workers to exert extra effort for example. In this paper, we consider a tournament in which workers are expected to be heterogenous, so that the principal cares about who is promoted, worker ability is, however, unknown to the principal.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02340174
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.

Volume (Year): 73 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 167-191

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:73:y:2001:i:2:p:167-191

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

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Keywords: rank-order tournament; selection; J41; C72;

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References

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  1. Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum 27/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Meyer, Margaret A, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41, January.
  3. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guasch, J Luis, 1988. "Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 867-81, August.
  4. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  5. Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-90, September.
  7. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
  8. Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1994. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 921-55, November.
  9. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
  10. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  11. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 523-34, May.
  12. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:2:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2007. "Contingent payments in selection contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 125-137, September.
  3. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
  4. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2013. "The optimality of heterogeneous tournaments," Working Papers IF42V1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
  5. Gürtler, Oliver, 2005. "Are 18 holes enough for Tiger Woods?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 44, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "Are 18 holes enough for Tiger Woods?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Selection tournaments, sabotage, and participation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  8. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
  9. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2001. "Rank-order tournaments and selection," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 167-191, June.
  10. Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 265-280, July.
  11. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 2000. "Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 109-124, May.
  12. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 118, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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